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I study a class of models commonly used to motivate monetary ex-
change, extended to include a physical asset whose expected short-run
return is subject to exogenous news events, but whose expected long-run
return is independent of this information. I show that there are circum-
stances in which the nondisclosure of news by an asset manager is welfare-
improving. When nondisclosure is infeasible, the framework admits a role
for government debt. The theory is used to interpret the nondisclosure
practices of reputable ﬁnancial agencies and suggests caveats for legisla-
tion designed to promote ﬁnancial market transparency.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Financial agencies are natural targets of intense scrutiny and criticism during a
ﬁnancial market crisis. One frequent criticism is the charge of a general lack of
transparency in ﬁnancial practices; ranging from vague accounting principles to
the outright nondisclosure of pertinent information. Implicit in these charges is
the idea that less transparency promotes a lack of accountability; which, in turn,
results in misaligned incentives and, ultimately, a misallocation of resources.
There is a widespread belief that eﬃciency is only enhanced when ﬁnancial
market participants are granted access to more information.
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1It is a matter of fact that ﬁnancial agencies frequently do depart from the
principle of full transparency. Private banks, for example, appear inclined to re-
port the value of their assets based on an internally generated “mark-to-model”
algorithm; the market value of assets is not necessarily disclosed. In a similar
vein, a money market mutual fund can avoid “breaking the buck” at the discre-
tion of its board members.1 Many other examples can be drawn from history.
During the banking panics of the U.S. National Banking Era (1863-1913), for
example, private clearinghouses (coalitions of private banks) would temporarily
suspend the publication of individual bank balance sheet information. More-
over, such practices are not relegated to the private sector. The Federal Reserve
Bank of the United States, for example, does not disclose the identity of agencies
that make use of its discount window facility. Nor do federal regulators make
public their internal assessments of the ﬁnancial soundness of private banks
under federal supervision.2
What is interesting, of course, is that these (and similar) practices are invari-
ably justiﬁed on the grounds of promoting economic eﬃciency. Understandably,
public tolerance for apologies of this sort wanes signiﬁcantly during an economic
crisis. A manifestation of this are legislative proposals designed to increase ﬁ-
nancial market transparency. The Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
Rule 157 constitutes one prominent example.3 Recent Congressional attempts
to diminish the powers of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank may similarly be in-
terpreted in this manner.4
The question I ask in this paper is whether legislative attempts to promote
the public disclosure of information in ﬁnancial markets necessarily constitute
a worthwhile social objective. This is, of course, a delicate issue. History is
replete with examples of private and public sector agencies exploiting informa-
tional advantages at the expense of society. Nevertheless, I do not believe that
the answer to this question is a foregone conclusion. In particular, reputable
agencies risk losing their credibility; and the punishment for this can be severe.
The nondisclosure practices of reputable agencies should therefore be examined
with an open mind.
In any case, economic theory is not entirely silent on the matter. Since
at least Jack Hirschleifer’s (1971) famous example, where additional informa-
tion destroys a desirable risk-sharing arrangement, economists have recognized
1Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 stipulates that “The board of directors
of the money market fund shall determine, in good faith, that it is in the best interests of the
fund and its shareholders to maintain a stable net asset value per share or stable price per
share, by virtue of either the Amortized Cost Method or the Penny- Rounding Method, and
that the money market fund will continue to use such method only so long as the board of
d i r e c t o r sb e l i e v e st h a ti tf a i r l yr e ﬂects the market-based net asset value per share.”
2These are the so-called Camels ratings, performed by the Federal Reserve Bank, the Oﬃce
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
3Rule 157 is the Fair Value Measurements accounting standard (or “mark-to-market” rule)
issued by FASB in September 2006 and implemented in November 2007.
4For example, a House panel chaired by Barney Frank (D-Mass) voted in favor of a sweeping
congressional audit of the “secretive” Federal Reserve on November 19, 2009.
2that more information is not necessarily welfare-improving. Alessandro Citanna
and Antonio Villanacci (2000) examine a class of economies where information
is communicated through prices; see also Roy Radner (1979). They establish
conditions under which increased information revelation through prices has an
ambiguous eﬀect on economic welfare; in doing so, they generalize Hirschleifer’s
(1971) original contribution. Their result is important because it emphasizes
that informationally eﬃcient asset prices (say, as postulated by the eﬃcient
markets hypothesis) are neither necessary or suﬃcient to guarantee allocative
eﬃciency. Related arguments are made in the agency literature. Andrea Prat
(2005), for example, explains why agency relationships may require more trans-
parency along some dimensions, but less transparency along other dimensions.5
These are ideas that I think should be explored further in the context of
monetary models. The motivation for this, as I have explained above, is the fact
that liquidity providers and regulators are currently at the center of proposed
legislative changes designed to promote ﬁnancial market transparency in one
way or another. It would be useful to have a theoretical framework to help
organize our thinking on the matter.
A good starting point, I think, is to investigate the properties of models
that are commonly used to motivate monetary exchange. I study two such
models. The ﬁrst is a textbook Wicksellian model where the disclosure of private
information leads to an economic collapse. While this model is perhaps too
simple for practical application, it demonstrates the underlying logic of the
basic argument in a simple and coherent (if rather dramatic) manner.
The second model is based on a framework popularized by Ricardo Lagos
and Randall Wright (2005); see also Randall Wright and Stephen D. Williamsom
(2008). A beneﬁt of this class of models is that it simultaneously takes seriously
the frictions that give rise to circulating media of exchange (or of record-keeping)
while preserving analytical tractability. I consider a natural extension of this
model where the expected short-term return on an asset is permitted to depend
on information. I show that there are circumstances in which the nondisclosure
of such information by an asset manager can improve social welfare. An impli-
cation of this is that high-frequency “mark-to-market” asset valuation methods,
contrary to their intended eﬀect, may actually promote allocative ineﬃciency.
When nondisclosure is infeasible, eﬃciency may be enhanced with the intro-
duction of a ﬁat money instrument whose return is relatively insensitive to
information aﬀecting the expected returns of competing assets; see also David
Andolfatto and Fernando Martin (2009). These and related arguments are for-
malized below.
5There is a sense in which the results cited here should not be surprising. In particular,
these and related propositions, may be interpreted as consequences that are known to follow
from the general theory of the second best; see Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster (1956).
32 A Wicksellian Model
The economy consists of  individuals and  time periods; where  is an inte-
ger, 3 ≤ ∞ Ex ante, all individuals are identical; ex post, they are divided
into  types; with each individual having an equal probability of realizing type
 ∈ {12}
All  6=  individuals are endowed with 0 ∞ units of nonstorable
output at date  The type  individual is endowed with a stochastic endow-
ment; it is equal to  with probability 0 1; and is otherwise equal to
zero. Hence, all individuals have an expected endowment equal to 
Let () denote consumption by individual  at date  ∈ {12} A
type  individual has linear preferences given by
 = ()+( +1 )
for  =1 2 (modulo ); where 0 1 That is, each individual values
his own endowment “a little bit;” but attaches greater value to endowment of the
person “next” to him on the circle. This pattern of preferences and endowments
generates a complete lack of double coincidence of wants.
This much is standard (for  =3  the model reduces to Wicksell’s famous
“triangle”). But here is the twist: assume that the type  individual receives
a private signal at the beginning of date 1 that perfectly reveals the future
realization of his endowment. I call this private signal “news,” since it con-
stitutes potentially important information pertaining to an impending future
event. News, when it arrives in this model, is either “good” or “bad.”
2.1 The Eﬃcient Allocation
The ex ante eﬃcient allocation is simple to characterize. In particular, each
individual  is required to transfer his endowment to individual  − 1 (modulo
). Each individual receives an ex ante utility payoﬀ equal to  (whereas
autarky generates the ex ante payoﬀ   ). Note that the eﬃcient allocation
is invariant to news.
Ex post,a l lt y p e 6=  − 1 individuals receive  units of output. The type
 − 1 individual receives either  units of output (with probability ), or
zero units of output (with probability 1 − ).
2.2 Private Information and Full Commitment
Consider now the planner’s problem when individuals cannot be relied upon to
reveal their private information truthfully. To begin, I assume that all individ-
uals can commit to any feasible allocation recommended by the planner. Of
4course, individuals cannot commit to revealing their private information truth-
fully; the mechanism will have to be incentive compatible. We may, without
loss, restrict attention to a direct revelation mechanism.
It should be immediately clear that, in this case, the eﬃcient allocation is
incentive compatible. At date 1, the type  individual receives good or bad news
concerning the value of his asset. As individual  is unaﬀected one way or the
other whether the news is good or bad, he reports it truthfully to the planner.
The planner, in turn, is free to make this information publicly available or not.
If the news is bad, individual  − 1 will suﬀer (ex post). But by assumption,
this latter individual is bound to make good on his promise to deliver  to
individual  −2 (rather than consume it himself, which he would clearly prefer
if permitted to do so).
2.3 Private Information and Limited Commitment
Assume now that commitment is limited in the sense that only the type 
individual can commit, while all other types cannot. Note that this is an en-
vironment where the revelation principle continues to hold. And indeed, the
eﬃcient allocation continues to be incentive compatible—but only if the planner
can promise to keep any solicited news from the public domain.
To see that this is the case, imagine that the planner makes the news public.
If the news is good, then the eﬃcient allocation is sequentially rational. But if
t h en e w si sb a d ,t h ee ﬃcient allocation is not sequentially rational; at least, not
for the type −1 individual. This latter individual would prefer to consume his
own endowment rather than exchange it for nothing. Anticipating that this will
b et h ec a s e ,t h et y p e−2 individual refuses to trade as well. Working backward
in this manner, it is evident that the entire “trading chain” will collapse—the
economy reverts to autarky in the bad news state.
Economic collapse in the event of bad new is, however, averted if the private
information is kept hidden. True, the type  −1 individual is made worse oﬀ in
an ex post sense; but ex ante, he—along with everyone else in this economy—would
insist on the nondisclosure of private information.
2.4 Money and Banking
Assume that all individuals, apart from type are anonymous. Then monetary
exchange is necessary. In principle, the monetary object may be issued by the
type  individual; i.e., in the form of a security representing a (stochastic)
claim against date  output (see Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore, 2002).
But I assume here that only the planner can issue noncounterfeitable notes. I
interpret the planner as a bank (an asset manager).
Trade proceeds as follows. At date 1, types are realized. The type  in-
dividual would like like to purchase output at date 1; but is in no position to
5make payment as his security is (by assumption) illiquid. So type  approaches
the bank for a money loan; that is, the bank issues a note in exchange for a
“deposit” consisting of the type  security (the security serves as collateral for
the money loan). As this banknote is universally recognized, it may potentially
circulate as currency. Indeed, the asset-transformation activity described here
is one of the primary functions of the banking sector.
Having obtained his money loan, type  pays for his date 1 output. Type
1 accepts the banknote, anticipating that he too will be able to use it to make
a future purchase. In this manner, eﬃcient exchanges are realized all along the
trading chain. At the ﬁnal date, the type −1 individual redeems the banknote
in exchange the security in deposit at the bank (a claim against date  output).
Needless to say, if these ex ante eﬃcient exchanges are to be realized, it is
imperative that the bank keep the true state of its balance sheet hidden from
society. In particular, revealing bad news in the interest of “transparency” would
render banknotes worthless (the underlying collateral is worth zero). True,
the banknotes would, in this event, be “properly” priced according to their
fair market value (an FASB accountant might be pleased). But if these notes
constitute the primary source of liquidity in an economy, the consequence of
such transparency is an economic collapse in at least some states of the world.
3A L a g o s - W r i g h t M o d e l
There is a unit measure of inﬁnitely-lived individuals, distributed uniformly on
[01] Time is discrete; with each time-period  =0 1∞ divided into two
subperiods, labeled day and night.
Output is produced in the day and the night. Let () ∈ R denote consump-
tion in the day by individual  ∈ [01] at date ; where ()  0 is interpreted
as production. Utility is linear in ()
At the beginning of the night, agents experience an idiosyncratic shock that
determines their type: consumer or producer. Consumption at night is denoted
() ∈ R+ and generates (for a consumer) the utility ﬂow (()) ∈ R; where
00  0  0 and (0) = 0 0(0) = ∞ Production at night is denoted () ∈ R+
and generates (for a producer) the utility ﬂow −(()) ∈ R; where (0) =
0(0) = 0 0  0 for 0 and 00 ≥ 0
For each individual, the stochastic process generating types is i.i.d. across
time. Assume that the population at night is at all times divided equally be-






 [()+0 5(()) − 05(())] (1)
6where 0 1
T h e r ei sad u r a b l ea s s e tt h a tg e n e r a t e s an exogenous and stochastic output
ﬂow  ∈ [] at the beginning of each day; 0 ≤  ≤ ∞ This aggregate
s h o c kf o l l o w saM a r k o vp r o c e s s ,Pr[+1 ≤ + |  = ]=(+ | ); where
 is a cumulative distribution function, conditional on information  (news)
received at the beginning of the night. Assume that news is either bad or good;
 ∈ {} and that  ≡ Pr[ = ].D e ﬁne
() ≡
Z
+(+ | ) (2)
where 0 ≤ () ≤ ()  ∞ That is, () is a “short-term” conditional forecast
made at night over the dividend payment that is to be realized the next day.
In contrast, the “long-term” forecast (horizons extending from one day to the
next and beyond) is invariant to news; i.e.,
 ≡ ()+( 1− )() (3)








The ﬁrst-best allocation maximizes (1) for an ex ante representative indi-
vidual, subject to the resource constraints (4), (5); and assuming that expecta-
tions are consistent with (2). The ﬁrst-best allocation may, without loss, assign
()=; so that each agent receives (in expectation)  units of output in the
day.6
Symmetry implies ()= and ()= An equal population of types at
night implies  = ; by virtue of (5) holding with equality. Optimality requires
 = ∗; with 0  ∗  ∞ satisfying
0(∗)=0(∗) (6)
The ﬁrst-best allocation delivers ex ante utility
∗ =( 1− )−1 [ +0 5(∗) − 05(∗)]
To motivate the need for record-keeping, I assume that all agents, apart
from that agent or agency in control of the durable asset, lack commitment.
6Note that owing to the quasilinear property of preferences, the presence of risk (whether
aggregate or idiosyncratic) has no eﬀect on ex ante welfare. The ﬁrst-best allocation here is
also consistent with any lottery over {()} that generates expected utility  for the agent.
7Although it is not necessary to do so, I also assume that an agent’s type (whether
consumer or producer) is private information. Only the asset manager (planner)
is privy to information ; and may choose to reveal it or not. Enforcement is
limited; the maximum penalty for noncompliance is perpetual ostracism. This
entails foregoing all future gains associated with ownership of the physical asset
in addition to the gains associated with risk-sharing at night. Allocations, in
short, are restricted to be sequentially rational and incentive compatible. A
feasible allocation with these two properties is called incentive-feasible.
3.1 Implementation with an Indirect Mechanism
I begin by examining the set of (stationary) allocations implementable with
an indirect mechanism. Let () denote the level of production required of a
producer (delivered to a consumer) at night when  =  Let () denote the
level of consumption (production, if negative) delivered to an agent in the day,
conditional on realization  =  and on whether the agent was a consumer
or producer the previous evening; i.e.,  ∈ {} Note that conditioning the
allocation on longer trading histories is unnecessary here, given the quasilinear
structure of preferences.
A night allocation {()()} generates an ex ante lifetime utility (()())
satisfying
(1 − )(()()) ≡ 025[(()) − (()) + (()) − (())]
Feasibility in the day requires ()+()=Hence, the total ex ante lifetime
utility associated with following the planner’s recommendation is (1 − )+
(()()) Noncompliance generates a lifetime utility equal to zero.
Since enforcement is limited, an allocation will have to satisfy a set of se-
quential rationality (SR) constraints. Anticipating that agents in the day who
were producers the previous night are to be rewarded, one can restrict attention
to those agents in the day who were consumers the previous night. To induce
participation of these latter agents, the following restriction must hold













 ≥ 0 (7)
Deﬁne  such that the SR constraint (7) holds with equality (notice that 
does not depend on ). By feasibility, one may also deﬁne () ≡  − 
Observe that [() − ]=[ (()) − ()] = − for  ∈ {}
At night, the situation is reversed: consumers are rewarded and produc-











This may be written more compactly as
−(()) + 
∙








for  ∈ {}; where + denotes the realization of  the following day. Notice
that the expectation [(+) | ] (the expected future reward) is formed using
information 
Consider next incentive-compatibility (IC). In the proposed mechanism, agents
reveal their types at night indirectly via their production decision. Matters are
simpliﬁed here by the fact that consumers are technologically prevented from
misrepresenting themselves as producers. Producers, on the other hand, may
misrepresent themselves as consumers. To ensure that this is not the case, the
following IC conditions must be satisﬁed
−(()) + 
∙

















for  ∈ {}
Observe that, by the deﬁnition of , the RHS of condition (9) is equal
to zero; see (7). It follows then that the SR constraints for the producer (8)
necessarily hold when the IC constraints for the producer (9) are satisﬁed. The
implication is that we can ignore (8) in what follows.7 Note that one can write
(9) more compactly as

£
[(+) | ] − 
¤
≥ (()) (10)
for  ∈ {}
Now, imagine for the moment that news is either absent or not disclosed. In
this case, the allocation must be invariant to news; so that ()= Condition
(10) may now be expressed as  [() − ] ≥ () Since () −  =
− this may alternatively be expressed as  [ − 2] ≥ () Employing the







7This is also true if the RHS of (9) is strictly positive; i.e., if (7) holds with strict inequality.
That is, the producer IC constraint is more restrictive for any given  than the producer SR
constraint.
9Restricting attention to levels of output such that ()  () the LHS of
(11) is monotonically increasing in  and approaches +∞ as  % 1 and some
ﬁnite positive number as  & 0 The RHS of (11) approaches −∞ as  & 0
and some bounded number (positive or negative) as  % 1 Hence, conditional
on some value for  there evidently exists a number 









Proposition 1 If news is either absent or not disclosed, then the ﬁrst-best allo-
cation is implementable for any  ∈ [
∗()1) Moreover, 
∗() is strictly de-
creasing in ; so that a higher expected asset return expands the set of economies
for which the ﬁrst-best remains implementable.
Notice that for a suﬃciently patient economy, the ﬁrst-best allocation is
implementable even in the absence of an asset (i.e., if  ≡ 0). Evidently, the
threat of ostracism from the night market is suﬃcient to induce participation
and truthful revelation. Such a threat may not be suﬃcient if  is suﬃciently
low. The presence of an asset, however, endows society with an added threat;
namely, the disentitlement from any claim to asset income. The force of this
added threat is greater, the larger the expected asset return. When   0
there are economies  ∈ [
∗()
∗(0)) for which ﬁrst-best implementation is
possible with an asset, but not without.
With these preliminaries out of the way, let me develop the main point of the
paper. Consider an economy for which   0 and  = 
∗() By Proposition
1 then, the ﬁrst-best allocation is (just) implementable if news is either absent
or not disclosed. In terms of condition (10) we have  [() − ]=(∗)
Imagine now that information  is available and that it is disclosed to the
public. The availability of this information does not, of course, aﬀect  It
does, however, inﬂuence the conditional forecasts that agents make at night;
i.e., ()    ()As a result, we have (())  ()  (()); which,
in turn, implies
 [(()) − ]  (∗) [(()) − ]
That is, the IC constraint (10) is violated in the bad news state, but not in the
good news state.
When the news is bad, the expected promised reward for producers at night
cannot be made large enough to induce truthful revelation (given that consumer
participation in the day must be respected as well); at least, not if producers are
asked to produce the ﬁrst-best level of output ∗ Truthful revelation requires
that producers be asked to produce less than the ﬁrst-best level of output in
the bad news state; in particular, a level ˆ () that satisﬁes
 [(()) − ]=(ˆ ()) (13)
10The constrained-eﬃcient allocation is therefore characterized by {()()} =
{ˆ ()∗} with ˆ ()  ∗ (since  is strictly increasing in ). It follows that
welfare is higher (the ﬁrst-best is implementable) when information  is not
disclosed.
Proposition 2 If 0  ()    () and  = 
∗() then the disclosure of
information  ∈ {} is welfare reducing.
Proposition 2 holds more generally for  in a neighborhood above 
∗();
all that is required is that the IC constraint (10) bind in the bad news state and
remain slack in the good news state. The opposite may hold true for 
∗();
but of course, this is beside the point.
3.2 Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, I restrict attention to a linear mechanism and study the impli-
cations of information disclosure on asset prices.
I have already assumed that agents lack commitment. In addition to this,
assume that they are anonymous in the sense that it is impossible for society (the
planner) to monitor individual trading histories directly. The implication of this
is that private credit is infeasible, so that payment for goods and services must
be made up-front with a tangible asset. A natural candidate for this tangible
asset are claims against the economy’s durable asset. In this way, equity shares
can serve as the economy’s payment instrument.
Each individual is initially endowed with one unit of the physical asset. The
planner (asset manager) oﬀers to take control of the asset in exchange for one
token; henceforth called a share. The asset manager promises to remit dividends
at the beginning of each day to each individual in proportion to their revealed
shareholdings. Individuals will voluntarily take up this oﬀer; as they anticipate
the possibility of using of shares as a medium of exchange.8
Apart from the initial period, I anticipate that the equilibrium distribution
of shares at the beginning of each day will fall on a two-point set { }; where
 ≥ 0 and  denotes the individual’s type in the previous night (consumer or
producer). Let (1 2) denote the price of a share measured in units of output;
in the day and night, respectively. In what follows, 1 denotes the ex-dividend
price.
3.2.1 Decision Making in the Day
Let  ≥ 0 denote shares carried forward into the night. The day budget con-
straint is then given by
 =(  + 1) − 1 (14)
8Note that the alternative is autarky.
11Let () denote the value of entering the day with shares  and with
realized dividend income Let () denote the ex ante ( b e f o r et y pei sk n o w n )
value of entering the night-market with share-holdings  when the news is 
The value functions  and  must satisfy the following recursion
() ≡ max
≥0
{( + 1) − 1 +  [()]} (15)
where here, I have substituted in the budget constraint (14).
Assume that the value function  is increasing and at least weakly concave in
; i.e., 11 ≤ 0  1 In fact, these are properties that will hold in equilibrium.
If 11  0 then each individual leaves the day-market with identical share-
holdings  characterized by
1 =  [1()] (16)
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), the distribution of wealth at the end of the day
is degenerate. If 11 =0  then desired individual share-holdings are indeter-
minate; at least, beyond some strictly positive lower bound. Even in this case,
however, condition (16) will continue to hold in any equilibrium.9





Given that the stochastic dividend ﬂow is an i.i.d. process from one day to the
next, and given quasi-linearity, the ex-dividend price of equity in the day will




 +)(+ | )=()+1 (17)
3.2.2 Decision Making at Night
Let () denote the value of being a consumer at night, with shares  and
when news is  Using  ≡ 2( − +







 )) + 
Z
(+
 +)(+ | )
¾
(18)
The consumer’s debt-constraint +
 ≥ 0 plays an important role in what fol-
lows.10 Utilizing (17), desired consumption is characterized by
2()0(()) =  [()+1] if 2() ()
()=2() otherwise (19)
Let () denote the value of being a producer at night, with money  and
when news is  Using  ≡ 2(+







 − )) + 
Z
(+
 +)(+ | )
¾
(20)
9If it did not hold, then the demand for shares would either be zero or inﬁnity.
10That is, consumers may wish to short equity, but are prevented from borrowing because
they are anonymous.
12Note that as a producer has no desire to consume, his debt-constraint is neces-
sarily slack. Utilizing (17), desired production is characterized by
2()0(()) =  [()+1] (21)
3.2.3 Market Clearing
The market-clearing conditions are given by
 =1and ()=() (22)
which will, of course, imply 05+
 ()+0 5+
 ()=1 
The object of interest here is the equilibrium allocation at night () to-
gether with the corresponding price system 1 and 2()To begin, consider (16).
Note that 1() ≡ 051()+0 51() Applying the envelope theorem
to (18) and (20), 1() ≡ 052()0(())+052()0(()) Condition (16)
may therefore be expressed as
1 =0 52()[0(()) + 0(())]+05(1−)2()[0(()) + 0(())] (23)







Finally, note that (19) and (21), together with market-clearing, imply
()=∗ if 2()  ∗
2()=()  ∗ otherwise (25)
Conditions (23), (24) and (25) constitute the key restrictions that charac-
terize the general equilibrium allocation and price-system for this competitive
economy.
3.2.4 A No-News Economy
I begin with a useful benchmark that I call a no-news economy;i . e . ,a s s u m e
that ()= for  ∈ {} It follows that 2()=2 and ()=
Now, conjecture that the debt-constraint remains slack. Then (25) implies
that  = ∗ and (24) implies 2 =  [ + 1]0(∗) This pricing function,







which appears to be the standard asset-pricing formula that one would expect
for risk-neutral agents.
13I need to conﬁrm that the conjecture I made with respect to (25) holds in
equilibrium; i.e., that 2  ∗ Using the 1 and 2 derived above, this latter






Whether this condition holds or not depends on parameters. The following
result is immediately apparent.
Proposition 3 A competitive equilibrium implements the ﬁrst-best allocation
for any  ≥ ˆ () ∈ (01); where ˆ  satisﬁes ˆ  ≡ (1 − ˆ )0(∗)∗
Proposition 3 is the analog to Proposition 1; the latter which holds for the
nonlinear mechanism studied there. As in Proposition 1, we see that ˆ () is
strictly decreasing in ; so that a higher expected asset return expands the set
of economies for which the ﬁrst-best is implementable.
It is instructive to examine a case for which ˆ () In this case, the debt-








Clearly, (∗)=1and 0()  0
Now, express condition (23) as 1 = 20()() Note that this implies
 [ + 1]= [ + 20()()]; or, using condition (24),
20()= [ + 20()()]
As 2 =  when the debt-constraint binds, the latter expression can be written
as
0()[1− ()] = 








In comparing the asset price functions (26) and (27), it appears that equity is
“over-valued” in the debt-constrained equilibrium relative to its “fundamental”
value. That is, people would like to borrow (or short equity) at night, but










14That is, the eﬀect of the binding debt constraint is to confer a “liquidity pre-
mium” on the price of equity; so that equity earns a lower expected rate of
return.11
3.2.5 A News Economy
By a news economy, I mean 0 ≤ ()    ()
If the debt-constraint never binds, then by (25), the competitive equilibrium
implements the eﬃcient allocation ()=∗ As a consequence, the equilibrium
asset price in the day is given by (26). Condition (24) then delivers an expression






That is, the equilibrium share price at night responds to news in the way one
would expect; i.e., 2()  2()
Thus, it is conceivable here that equity will serve as an eﬃcient payments
instrument. While the price of this monetary instrument ﬂuctuates randomly
at night in response to new information, this price volatility in no way inhibits
ex ante eﬃciency. This is true as long as share price movements do not leave
consumers debt-constrained in some states of the world; a possibility that I now
consider.
Proposition 4 If 0 ≤ ()    () and  = ˆ () then the consumer
debt constraint will bind tightly in the bad news state and remain slack in the
good news state.
I relegate the formal proof of Proposition 4 to the appendix as the intu-
ition should be clear enough; especially in light of the discussion surrounding
Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 and condition (25) imply that 2()=()  ()=∗
Appealing to (23) and (24), the equilibrium (1()) is characterized by
1 = [()+1](()) + (1 − )[()+1]
0(())()= [()+1]
Solving for the ex-dividend price of equity in the day
1 = 
∙
()(()) + (1 − )()
1 − ((()) + 1 − )
¸
(28)
11In a model with endogenous capital accumulation, the analogous result is an over-
accumulation of capital; see Ricardo Lagos and Guillaume Rocheteau (2008).
15Note that (28) reduces to (26) when ()=∗ Hence, as long as ()  ∗
equity commands a “liquidity premium.”







It is curious to note that 2()  2() appears possible here (unless  is linear).
If this is so, then the debt constraint would bind in the good news state and
remain slack in the bad news state; a possibility ruled out by Proposition 3.
Hence, 2()  2(); a result that is immediately apparent for the case 00 =0 
A few points are worth stressing here. First, it follows as a direct corollary to
Proposition 3 that the ﬁrst-best allocation can be implemented if information 
is not disclosed by the asset manager. Bad news has the eﬀect of (temporarily)
depressing asset prices at night; an eﬀect that here renders consumers with
insuﬃcient money balances to purchase the ﬁrst-best level of output (their debt
constraint binds). In light of Proposition 2, this is tantamount to the planner
being unable to credibly promise producers a suﬃciently large future reward to
induce truthful revelation.
Second, under the conditions stated in Proposition 3, informationally-eﬃcient
asset prices are inconsistent with allocative eﬃciency. There is a sense here in
which informationally-eﬃcient asset prices display “excess volatility” at high
frequency; the allocation is improved (the debt constraint will not bind) if asset
prices could somehow be rendered insensitive to high-frequency news events.
Moreover, this excess volatility results in a “liquidity premium” for asset prices
(assets are valued for their medium of exchange properties).
As in the Wicksellian model studied earlier, the public revelation of news
would not be socially detrimental if people were not anonymous and/or had
the power to commit to their promises. But as Narayana Kocherlakota (1998)
has emphasized, it is precisely the limitations along these dimensions that make
monetary exchange (record-keeping) necessary. When this is so, individuals may
ﬁnd themselves debt-constrained by a temporary decline in the value of their
liquid assets (a price decline that bears little, if any, relation to the fundamental
long-run value of their monetary asset). Welfare is enhanced here by suppress-
ing the high-frequency information ﬂow that generates excess volatility in the
value of the economy’s payment instrument. Suppressing this high-frequency
information ﬂow stabilizes the short-run expected return of a monetary instru-
ment (around its long-run fundamentals), so that consumers are never caught
short of “cash” in bad news events.
3.3 A Role for Government Debt
Circumstances may dictate that privately-valued information cannot be kept
secret from society. If nondisclosure is infeasible (or prohibited by legislation),
16then it would appear that ﬁrst-best implementation in the environment studied
here may not be possible for impatient economies. In fact, this need not be the
case. The following discussion draws heavily on David Andolfatto (in press);
the reader is referred there for details.
Andolfatto (in press) studies the properties of an environment identical to
the Lagos and Wright (2005) model studied above; except absent any asset.
He restricts trade among agents to be competitive. It is well-known for this
environment that the introduction of a ﬁat money instrument, along with a de-
ﬂation ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax, can implement the ﬁrst-best allocation (this
is the celebrated Friedman rule). This is a result that holds for all 0 1.
Andolfatto (in press), demonstrates that ﬁrst-best implementation is still possi-
ble when lump-sum taxation is infeasible (that is, if all trade is restricted to be
voluntary); this is also shown to be the case for all 0 1 The added restric-
tion of voluntary trade rules out deﬂationary policies. Eﬃcient implementation
requires the use of interest-bearing government debt; with interest ﬁnanced in
part by inﬂation and in part by a voluntary “redemption fee” on government
debt.
What these results suggest is the following. If the Friedman rule (or its
variant considered in Andolfatto, in press) is a feasible policy, then eﬃcient im-
plementation is independent of the existence of a physical asset. This suggests
that the introduction of a government asset may be necessary to improve eﬃ-
ciency when: [1] in the absence of the government asset, claims to a physical
asset are used as a medium of exchange; and when [2] information relating to
the physical asset’s short-term returns cannot be kept hidden from traders.
The theme that emerges from this discussion is that society may ﬁnd it
desirable to create media of exchange whose expected returns are independent
of the high-frequency information ﬂow that is unavoidably capitalized in other
asset prices. The construction of such “informationally-insensitive” assets is
also a theme pursued (albeit in a somewhat diﬀerent context) by Gary Gorton
and George Pennacchi (1990).12
I have limited attention here to the role that government debt may play as
a medium of exchange. Alternatively, one might explore the extent to which
private sector debt with similar attributes may be created to fulﬁll this role. In
f a c t ,p r i v a t eb a n k sd og ot os o m el e n g t hi nc reating “informationally-insensitive”
debt for this purpose. Such an activity would appear to extend to the so-called
“shadow-banking” sector; which oversaw the creation of “low-risk” securities
(e.g., AAA rated tranches of asset-backed securities) used extensively as collat-
eral in the repo market; see Gary Gorton (2009).
12Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) develop a model that it relies on the presence of asymmetric
information between “informed” and “uninformed” traders. In their environment, one solution
to this problem is for a ﬁrm to split the cash ﬂow of their asset portfolio between risky equity
and risk-free debt. The debt instrument here is “informationally insensitive” in that its value
is independent of any news received by informed traders. In this manner, uninformed agents
can be induced to acquire and use debt for transaction purposes.
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Some form of record-keeping is necessary to support desirable allocations when
agents lack commitment and enforcement is limited. The presence of a physical
asset generally expands the set of implementable allocations because promised
rewards and punishments are enhanced with entitlements to asset returns. If
agents are in addition anonymous so that “memory” is absent, durable and non-
counterfeitable physical tokens representing claims to the asset can substitute
for the missing memory.13 In a competitive economy, these tokens take the form
of equity shares that circulate as a medium of exchange.
In an asset economy, the short-run expected return to an asset may depend
on high-frequency news events. The dividend return of capital, for example,
may occur quarterly; while news concerning this expected return may arrive
daily. When asset markets are informationally eﬃcient, this high-frequency news
is embedded immediately into the market price of the security. This poses a
potential problem for the use of securities as a means of ﬁnancing high-frequency
payments. On any given day, a consumer holding equity as a means of payment
may ﬁnd the value of his current holdings insuﬃcient to ﬁnance a planned
expenditure.
For an asset economy then, the prescription of “full transparency” is not
generally warranted. In competitive economies, the disclosure of high-frequency
information unrelated to an asset’s “long-run fundamentals” may be detrimental
to economic welfare when claims to such assets serve as high-velocity payment
instruments. The equilibrium price of a liquid asset is excessively volatile when
asset prices capitalize all information. This general result appears not to be an
artifact of competitive exchange; it is more fundamental than this. In particular,
I have also shown that it holds for non-competitive (nonlinear) constrained-
eﬃcient allocations.
The basic idea developed here may be of some use in interpreting the nondis-
closure practices used by banks (issuers of high-velocity payment instruments) in
the past. It may even go some way to explaining the apparently “opaque” prop-
erties of the asset-backed securities that, until recently, circulated extensively in
the shadow banking sector. Unfortunately, these highly rated securities (as with
the demandable bank liabilities issued prior to the establishment of the FDIC)
turned out to be more “informationally sensitive” than previously imagined.
The implications of this have yet to be worked out.
It may be the case, as in the model considered above, that the government
has a comparative advantage in creating informationally-insensitive debt. To
the extent that this is true, society may stand to beneﬁt from its use. It may
even be desirable to prohibit the use of private securities in some segments of
an economy’s payments system (insisting, for example, on the use of govern-
13The idea that physical tokens may constitute a substitute form of record-keeping is em-
phasized by Narayana Kocherlakota (1998); see also Robert M. Townsend (1987) and Joseph
M. Ostroy (1973).
18ment treasuries as collateral in repo). This, as well as other legislative changes
designed to enhance ﬁnancial market transparency, deserve careful study before
they are implemented. Approaching the problem under the premise that fuller
transparency is always desirable may not be the right place to start.
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21Appendix
Proof to Proposition 3
Proposition 3 asserts that if 0 ≤ ()    () and  = ˆ () then the
consumer debt constraint will bind tightly in the bad news state and remain
slack in the good news state. This can be demonstrated as follows.
Lemma 1 The debt-constraint cannot remain slack in both news states.
Proof. Assume that the debt-constraint remains slack in both news states.
Then ()=()=∗ so that (23) implies
1 = ( + 1)






≥ ∗ for  ∈ {}
This latter condition implies  [()+1] ≥ ∗0(∗) Since ()    () it
follows that






which is a contradiction.
Lemma 2 The debt-constraint cannot bind tightly in both news states.
Proof. Assume that the debt-constraint binds tightly in both news states.
Then (23) and (24) imply
1 = [()+1](()) + (1 − )[()+1](())
or, by collecting terms,
1 [1 − (()) − (1 − )(())] = ()(()) + (1 − )()(())
As both debt-constraints bind, (25) implies that ()  ∗ for  ∈ {}; so
that (())  1 for  ∈ {} Combining this information with the equation







The expression above implies
 [ + 1]  [ + ∗0(∗)]  ∗0(∗) (29)
22Condition (25) implies 2()=()  ∗ for  ∈ {} so that by condition
(24)
()0(()) =  [()+1]
()0(()) =  [()+1]
Since  = ()+( 1− )() it follows from these latter two restriction that
2()0(()) + (1 − )2()0(()) =  [ + 1] (30)
Conditions (29) and (30) imply
2()0(()) + (1 − )2()0(())  ∗0(∗) (31)
But as 0() is strictly increasing in  and as ()  ∗ the inequality in (31)
is impossible.
Lemma 3 The debt-constraint cannot bind in the good-news state and remain
slack in the bad-news state.
Proof. Assume that the debt-constraint binds in the good-news state and
remains slack in the bad-news state. Then (25) implies 2()  ∗ and 2()=
()  ∗ Moreover, by condition (24)
2()0(∗)= [()+1]
()0(()) =  [()+1]
As ()  () these latter equations imply
()0(())  2()0(∗)  ∗0(∗)
B u tt h i si si m p o s s i b l e ;a s0() is strictly increasing in  and as ()  ∗
The three lemmas above rule out three out of the four possible conﬁgurations.
The only remaining conﬁguration is as characterized in the text; where the debt-
constraint binds in the bad-news state and remains slack in the good-news state.
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